Electronically Filed
3/1/2019 5:13 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GREGORY CONAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45749
Ada County Case No.
CR01-2017-12505

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Williams failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict finding
him guilty of stalking in the first degree, or by relinquishing jurisdiction?

Williams Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A jury found Williams guilty of stalking in the first degree, and the district court imposed
a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.210-11,
234-37.) Williams filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.23840.) Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and
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executed Williams’ underlying sentence. (Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Commitment
(Aug., pp.24-26).)
Williams asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time felon, family
support, and “work ethic.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)

The record supports the sentence

imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits

2

prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum sentence for stalking in the first degree is five years. I.C. § 18-7905. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, which falls within
the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.234-37.) Furthermore, Williams’ sentence is appropriate in
light of the seriousness of the offense and his failure to accept full responsibility for his actions.
Although this is Williams’ first felony conviction, his prior criminal history demonstrates
his violent behavior and failure to abide by the law.

Williams’ criminal record includes

misdemeanor convictions for inattentive driving (amended from reckless driving), driver’s
license violation, two counts of malicious injury to property, and two counts of harassment.
(PSI, pp.3-5. 1) Williams’s record also includes several dismissed charges, including assault in
the fourth degree-domestic violence, strangulation, menacing, second degree animal abuse,
battery, malicious injury to property, possession of marijuana, and two counts of failure to
provide insurance. (PSI, pp.4-5.) At the time of sentencing, Williams was also facing a pending
misdemeanor telephone harassment charge. (PSI, p.5.)
In this case, Williams stalked the victim and, in the process, violated an active no contact
order by following the victim to a concert, sitting within one foot of her, walking past her several
times, and “staring at [her] with a ‘creepy’ smile on his face.” (PSI, pp.2, 20.) In the three days
leading up to that conduct, the victim had called the police several times because Williams was
“disrupting [her] freedom of day to day activities,” including by showing up at her place of
employment, making the victim feel “very uncomfortable.” (PSI, pp.2, 20.) Williams, however,
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Williams 45749
psi.pdf”
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denied that he did anything wrong. He told the presentence investigator, “I was charged with
stalking because I cooperated with police twice which generated two police reports, then the
victim came to my roommates concert and called the cops on me for being there,” and “I’m not
sure how replying to her constant contact was criminal.” (PSI, p.3.) He made similar statements
in his Domestic Violence and Stalking Assessment and also blamed the victim, stating, “She
lies, she tells hundreds of lies,” and “I am in jail based on lies.” (PSI, pp.460-61.) Williams’
family support and work ethic do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense or his failure to
accept full responsibility for his actions.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Williams’ sentence including the seriousness
of the offense, Williams’ failure to take full responsibility for his actions, and the need for the
victim and the community to be protected. (12/18/17 Tr., p.892, L.1 – p.896, L.12.) The state
submits that Williams has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set
forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its
argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Williams next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction, claiming his “performance while on his rider indicated he had high potential for
rehabilitation and suitability for probation.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) Williams has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
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248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205–06, 786 P.2d 594, 596–97 (Ct.App.1990)). A court's decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154
Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)). “While a recommendation from corrections officials who supervised the defendant
[during the period of retained jurisdiction] may influence a court's decision, it is purely advisory
and is in no way binding upon the court.” State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 950, 958
(Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998); State
v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct.App.1990)). Likewise, an offender’s
“[g]ood performance while on retained jurisdiction, though commendable, does not alone
establish an abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to grant probation.” Hurst,
151 Idaho at 438, 258 P.3d at 958 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)).
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was appropriate in light of the
seriousness of the offense and Williams’ failure to follow institutional rules.

The state

acknowledges that Williams completed his programming during the period of retained
jurisdiction and that NICI staff recommended the court consider placing him on probation. (PSI,
pp.483-94.) However, Williams received 10 warnings while on his rider program, and staff,
while acknowledging that the warnings were for “minor rule violations,” noted that it was
“somewhat concerning that he would receive multiple warnings for the same behavior.” (PSI,
p.485.) Moreover, while NICI staff reported Williams “met the minimum levels of competency
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in the group,” they also noted that Williams “struggle[d] to identify risky situations and how they
put him at risk for negative thinking and behavior.” (PSI, p.485.)
At the disposition hearing, the district court was unimpressed by Williams’ failure to
follow institutional rules and ultimately concluded Williams was not a suitable candidate for
probation, explaining:
And ten rule infractions on a Rider – that should be perfect – causes me
real concern about your ability to follow rules in the community. That’s all that
this is about. And based on your performance alone on your Rider, I’m
relinquishing jurisdiction.
….
I’m not doing this because I think you’re a bad person or to further punish
you. I’m simply doing it because I can’t put you in the community. I think you
have a lot of support in the community, a lot of love here in the courtroom for
you. I hope you use that to figure out how to follow rules. Because at the end of
this fixed time, you’re going to have a parole commission hearing. And, you
know, the victim in your case may show up at that parole commission hearing,
and she may address the parole commission. And if you can’t show them that you
can follow rules, they’re not going to let you out. And you’re going to be in for
another two years.
I’m not saying this to lecture you. I hope you don’t hear it that way. It’s
because I want you to figure out how to get yourself out of prison and how to
comply with societal rules and regulations.
(6/4/18 Tr., p.34, L.19 – p.35, L.23.) Given any reasonable view of the facts, Williams has failed
to establish that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of March, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

C3 KO h)

The reason
Mr. Williams,

pulled out the code book,

I

is because one of the things you

said at the very end is you hoped probation would
be a consideration.

And

exact words because,

under law, I‘m required to

I

consider probation first.

thought about those

In other words,

the law

tells me that that's my default.
In order for me to impose

sentence,

I

a

different

have to find one of these particular

And I'm reading from

10

things applies in the case.

11

Idaho Code 19—2521.

12

shall deal with a person who has been convicted of

13

a

14

imprisonment" -- SO that's my default,

15

imprisonment —— “unless“ —— and here's the unless

16

section —— "having regard to the nature and

1?

circumstances of the crime and the history,

13

character, and condition of the defendant,

19

of the Opinion that imprisonment is appropriate

20

for protection of the public because" —— and then

2l

there's several factors here.

22

undue risk that during

23

sentence -— in other words, probation —— that you

24

might commit another crime.

25

And it says:

crime without imposing

a

a

"The Court

sentence of
is n0

it is

One is that there's

period of

a

suspended

Another is that the defendant is in
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need of correctional treatment that can be

provided most effectively by the defendant's
Another is that

commitment to an institution.

a

lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness
of defendant's crime;

or imprisonment will provide

appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or imprisonment will provide an

appropriate deterrent to other persons in the
community; 0r the defendant is
10

a

multiple offender

or professional criminal.

The prosecutor said to me,

11

and

I

wrote

"Daysha deserves to be protected, and

12

this down,

13

incarceration is the only thing that will

14

accomplish that."
My problem is the problem that

15

16

Daysha Hampton highlighted to me in talking to me

17

earlier,

13

you for five years.

19

she's not going to be protected and neither is

2O

anybody else.

21

what you have done may deserve

22

prison and although

23

the State is arguing for it,

24

I'm best going to protect her by putting you in

25

prison.

and that is that

And

I

can only incarcerate

And at the end of five years,

say that to say that although

I

I

a

sentence 0f

agree with the reasons that
I

don‘t think that

I'm concerned that that's going to make
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you worse.

I'm also concerned about putting you on

probation because

I

don't think you're

candidate for probation for

lot of reasons.

a

Some of it is your criminal history.
is your refusal t0 acknowledge the

case.

good

a

Some of it

facts of this

Some of it are the inconsistencies of what

you tell people.

Some 0f it are,

what

frankly,

I

view as delusional thinking.
10

think that your attorney argued that

I

11

the PSI says that you're

12

probation.

13

you are a guarded candidate for probation.

14

I'm sharing with you my thought

But

I

a

candidate for

will note that even the PSI says

know that you're

very intelligent

15

process.

16

person.

17

would be concerned for the safety of the

18

community.

19

would be concerned that when you get out, the

20

Community is less safe because I‘m maxed out at

21

five years.

I

If

were to put you on probation,

I

If

I

were to put you in prison,

So with that,

22

what

I

impose

24

by two years indeterminate.

25

jurisdiction.

I

I

I

am going to do is

sentence of three years fixed,

23

a

a

followed

am going to retain

I‘m going to send you on
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a

Rider.

£3 LD Ln

if you have

When you are done with that Rider,

done everything perfectly and taken those lessons
to heart,

you‘ll be in

placed on probation.

a

position where you can be

If you don't succeed in the

Rider program, you‘ll stay in prison for as long
as the department keeps you,

but

minimum of

a

three years with credit for the time that you have
served.
Now,

one of the things

I

specifically

10

want to talk to you about, because it‘s something

11

that Ms. Hampton mentioned,

12

One 0f -— frankly,

13

retaining jurisdiction instead of putting you in

14

prison is because

I

15

to work with you,

should you be placed on

l6

probation,

than

one of the very reasons why I'm

think

will have more ability

I

would if you were on parole.

I

In other words,

1?

is this ankle monitor.

I

can put you on an

condition of probation.

13

ankle monitor as

19

don't trust parole to do that.

20

putting all my cards on the table so you can hear

21

all my thinking on this.

22

to agree with me,

a

Again,

I

I'm just

You certainly don't have

but that is the sentence.

I‘m imposing court costs,

23

But

only public

24

defender reimbursement of $250, no fine

25

whatsoever.
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C3

There is

a

five—year no—contact order

that I'm going to have you sign.

It

says that

you‘re to have n0 contact whatsoever with
Daysha Hampton.

Please take all of the time you

need to read that and ask me any questions you

might have about it.
So the credit for time served that

have,

as 0f today's date,

I

is 251 days.

What happens now is completely in your
in terms of how you dig in the programming

10

hands,

11

in the Department of Corrections.

l2

again when you‘re done with the programs.

13
14

MR.

BAILEY:

Your Honor,

I'm going to keep

the presentence materials for Mr.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR.

17

THE COURT:

BAILEY:

I‘ll see you

Gallery.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Your Honor.
We'll be in recess.

18

(The proceedings concluded.)

19
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